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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the stand18 may have been negatived. The Court would have been
justified in finding that the statute created guilt by legislative flat
and so violated due process.1 9 In construing presumption statutes,
the Court should not forget that great caution should be used not
to let fiction deny the fair play that can be secured only by a pretty
close adhesion to fact.
Trial-ReversibleErrors
Irrespective of the guilt or innocence of a defendant, he is
entitled to a fair and orderly trial. Of vital importance to him
are the rules pertaining to the admissibility of evidence and the
conduct of the prosecution. Two important decisions rendered by
the Court in this regard are People v. Ford0 and People, v.
Hetenyi.21'
In the Ford case, the appellant had been found guilty of first
degree murder.m A psychiatrist had examined him before the
administration of a "truth serum", again while appellant was
under the effects thereof, and a third time after the effects had
worn off. As a defense witness he was permitted to testify regarding the first and third examinations but not as to the second.
Failure to permit the jury to hear and consider the results of this
second examination was cited by the appellant on appeal as error
entitling him to a reversal of the conviction. Although the conviction was affirmed, a vigorous dissent by Judge Desmond indicates
that the use of the evidence offered by the defense is hardly
startling in this scientific age. 3 Judge Desmond was of the opinion
that the proferred evidence was not in the same class with the
results of a lie detector test. which the New York courts have not
accepted as admissible. 24 The Court's reluctance to accept the
evidence is not in keeping"with the
spirit of judicial modernization
25
exemplified in Woods 1. Lancet.

18. CoDE oF Cnr . PRoc. § 393: "The defendant in all cases may' testify as a witness
in his own behalf, but his neglect or refusal to testify does not create any presumption
against him."
.19. See Tot v. U. S., 319 U. S. 463 (194i).
20. 304 N. Y. 679, 197 N. E. 2d 595 (1952).
21. 304 N. Y. 80, 106 N. E. 2d 20 (1952).
22. PENAL LAW §§ 1044-1045.
23. There is widespread use of radar checks in obtaining convictions for speeding
in the lower courts of this State. The sufficiency of the evidence has not yet been
tested at the Court of Appeals.
24. People v. Forte, 279 N. Y. 204, 18 N. E. 2d 31 (1938).
25. See ToRrs, this Section, 120-122.
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previously tried
In People v. Hetenyi26 the appellant had been
and found guilty of second degree murder, 27 but 2on appeal the
Appellate Division reversed, ordering a new trial. 29 On retrial,
the appellant was found guilty of first degree murder. From this
second conviction he appealed directly to the Court of Appeals.3
Over the objections of the defense, the prosecutor had obliquely
commented on the appellant's refusal to take the stand, and in
his summation had referred to the appellant's repeated changes of
religious affiliation. The Court of Appeals, in a 4-3 decision, ruled
for a new triaL3 ' If the alleged errors could in any way have
produced the verdict returned by the jury, there should be a reversal. Difficulty arises when the Court, as in the Hetenyi case, is
facts proved at the trial have established the
convinced that the
32
appellant's guilt.

The rule appears to be that where the appellant's guilt is
borne out during the trial by the facts proved, the Court, on appeal,
will cast an eagle's eye to the procedure used to reach the final
verdict, and be prone to label errors as something more than
"technical".
Coram Nobis
Ever since Lyons v. Goldstein,33 the Court has been constantly
adding to the body of law surrounding the post conviction relief
of writ of error coram nobis. A case of major import involving
the writ was People v. Richetti.3 There the Court laid down the
proposition that the denial of the writ without a hearing constituted
a deprivation of due process whenever the petitioner's allegations
were not conclusively refuted by unquestionable documentary proof.
26. Supra 3L 21.
27. PEAL LAw §§ 1046-1048.
28. 277 App. Div. 310, 98 N. Y. S. 2d 990 (4th Dep't 1950).
29. PENAL LAW §§ 1044-1045.
30. CODE OF CGm PRoc. §§ 517-520.
31. § 542 of the CODE OF CiM.PRoc. provides: "After hearing the appeal, the Court

must give judgment, without regard to technical errors or defects or to exceptions
which do not affect the substantive rights of the parties."

- 32. The Court's opinion as to the guilt of the appellant is unfortunate, and may
prove prejudicial in the new trial ordered.

33. 290 N. Y. 219, 47 N. E. 2d 425 (1943).
34. 302 N...Y. 290, 97 N. E. 2d 908..(1951).

